We formalize the notion of several weakened random oracle models in order to capture which property of a hash function is crucial to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme. In particular, we focus on augmenting the random oracle with additional oracles that respectively return collisions, secondpreimages, and first-preimages. We study the security of the full domain hash signature scheme, as well as three variants thereof in the weakened random oracle models, leading to a separation result.
Introduction

B
ÖÓÙÒ . When analyzing the security of cryptographic schemes, we often idealize hash functions as truly random functions called random oracles. A number of schemes were proposed and proved secure in the random oracle model (ROM) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] .
When it comes to implementations of the cryptographic schemes, we have to replace the random oracles by cryptographic hash functions. This replacement might make the cryptographic schemes insecure.
An important thing is that one should carefully observe the properties of the ROM, which are necessary for proving the security of the schemes, and replace the random oracles with some suitable hash functions. For example the security of the hash-and-sign type signature schemes, which are secure in the ROM, relies on the collision resistance property of the ROM. If one can obtain two distinct m m ¼ such that h(m) h(m ¼ ) and the signature Sig(h(m)), then (m ¼ ) is a valid forgery. Therefore, this case requires that a hash function is collision resistant.
Recent progress [6, 7] on the attacks against cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5, raises the question on the assumption that hash functions are collision resistant. Therefore, it is interesting to know whether the collision resistance property of the ROM is necessary for proving the security of the schemes. More generally, it is worth classifying the schemes by the properties of the ROM that their security essentially rely on.
OÙÖ ÓÒØÖ ÙØ ÓÒ×. By using Liskov's idea, we propose the following three models: the collision tractable random oracle model (CT-ROM), the second-preimage tractable random oracle model (SPT-ROM), and the first-preimage tractable random oracle model (FPT-ROM). The CT-ROM (resp. SPT-ROM, FPT-ROM) consists of the random oracle and the collision (resp. second-preimage, first-preimage) oracle that returns collisions (resp. second-preimages, first-preimages).
Our models are a bit di«erent from those of Liskov with respect to: first, in our model, the collision oracle may not provide a collision even if there are collisions, while in the Liskov model it always provides a collision; second, in our model, the secondpreimage (resp. first-preimage) oracle provides if there is no second-preimage (resp. first-preimage). Liskov only considered compression functions, where there are some collisions and preimages with high probability. When taking into account expanding functions, the Liskov model turns out to be too strong.
Notice here that it can be shown that the security with respect to the random oracle model with oracle-dependent auxiliary input implies the security with respect to the CT-ROM, since the oracle-dependent auxiliary input can contain a suAEciently long list of collisions. For the security with respect to the SPT-ROM and the FPT-ROM, the proof technique employed in [8] cannot be applied to our models. This is because the random oracle model with oracle-dependent auxiliary input does not capture the attack models with adaptive queries.
In almost all the proofs employing the random oracles, the reduction algorithms simulate the random oracles with embedding the target problem instances. We give new oracle simulation methods that are applicable for our models. These methods are useful to simulate both the random oracle and the additional oracles when analyzing the security of cryptographic schemes.
In our models, we consider the security of two RSA-based signature schemes: RSA-FDH [3] and RSA-PFDH [12] , which are simple and popular. In particular, we focus on the existential unforgeability under the adaptive chosen message attack [13] , and show the following statements.
1. RSA-FDH is not secure in the CT-ROM. 2. RSA-PFDH is secure in the CT-ROM, but not secure in the SPT-ROM.
Moreover, we slightly modify RSA-PFDH to obtain two variants which we call RSA-PFDH · and RSA-PFDH¨. We consider their security and show the following statements.
3. RSA-PFDH · is secure in the SPT-ROM, but not secure in the FPT-ROM. 4. RSA-PFDH¨is secure in the FPT-ROM.
We summarize the security of the four schemes in Table 1 . 
RSA-PFDH¨secure
In conclusion, we show the relations among our models. Let S be a security notion and M 1 M 2 models. Let S M 1 µ S M 2 and S M 1 S M 2 be as follows.
-S M 1 µ S M 2 : for any signature scheme ¦ if ¦ meets a security notion S in the model M 1 , then ¦ also meets S in the model M 2 .
there exists a signature scheme ¦ such that ¦ meets a security notion S in the model M 1 while ¦ doesn't meet S in the model M 2 .
It is clear from the definitions of the models that the following relations hold for any security notion S (see Section 3).
S ROM´S CT-ROM´S SPT-ROM´S FPT-ROM
From Table 1 , under the RSA assumption we can show the separations for the security notion S ¼ : the existential unforgeability under the adaptive chosen message attack, that is, the following relations hold.
In Section 2, we give some notation. Our models are presented in Section 3. We discuss the security of the schemes in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we make a few remarks on our models and schemes.
Preliminaries
Notation
If is a distribution, x denote that x is sampled according to , and let f (x) be the probability mass function of distribution . Let B(N p) be the binomial distribution with N trials and success probability p.
Let S be a finite set. Let s S denote that s is sampled from the uniform distribution on S . #S denotes the number of elements in S .
If is a probabilistic machine and x is an input, let (x) denote the output distribution of on input x.
Let be a boolean function. 
Digital Signature Schemes
We review a model of digital signature schemes. SÝÒØ Ü. A digital signature scheme over message space Å is defined by the following three algorithms.
-The key generation algorithm Gen. On input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, the algorithm produces a public»secret key pair (pk sk).
-The signing algorithm Sig. Given a secret key sk and a message m ¾ Å, the algorithm produces a signature on the message m.
-The verification algorithm Ver. Given a public key pk, a message m, and a signature , the algorithm outputs a bit . If 1 the signature is accepted with respect to pk and rejected otherwise.
We require that for all (pk sk) output by Gen(1 k ) and for all message m ¾ Å, Ver(pk m Sig(sk m)) 1 should be satisfied.
In the rest of the paper we omit pk sk and write Ver(m ) as Ver(pk m ), and Sig(m) as Sig(sk m) for short.
S ÙÖ ØÝ NÓØ ÓÒ×. A widely accepted standard security notion was defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [13] , as the existential unforgeability under the adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-CMA).
Definition 1.
A polynomial-time oracle query machine is said to break the signature scheme (Gen Sig Ver) if after making signing queries adaptively, it outputs, with nonnegligible probability, a valid forgery that was never queried.
Definition 2 (EUF-CMA).
A signature scheme (Gen Sig Ver) is said to be secure if there is no polynomial-time oracle query machine that breaks the scheme.
Our Models
We formalize the notion of weakened random oracle models that were mentioned by Liskov [10] . Each of our models provides a random oracle together with another oracle that breaks some property of the random oracle model. First we review the random oracle model, and then propose three models.
The Random Oracle Model (ROM)
Let X Y be finite sets. The random oracle model has a hash function h chosen randomly from all of the functions from X to Y and the random oracle associated with h. A hash function h can be considered as a hash table Ì h which defines the correspondence of the elements in X with the elements in Y. In this model, all of the parties (including the adversary) have access to the random oracle. When the hash value of x is queried, the random oracle answers the corresponding value Ý in Ì h .
In almost all the proofs employing the random oracles, the reduction algorithms simulate the random oracles with embedding the target problem instances. We consider how to simulate the random oracle except for the embedding. In a standard way, we simulate the random oracle maintaining a 
Pick n ¼ according to the following binomial distribution:
Set n n In order to analyze this algorithm, we assume that we can eAEciently sample from the binomial distribution B(N p) perfectly. There are quite many papers on the eAEcient sampling from the binomial distribution [14] . However, we could neither find precise analysis of their methods nor analyze precisely by ourselves. Therefore, we have to employ the following assumption in the analyses of all of our simulations.
Assumption 1. There is a polynomial-time machine such that the distribution (N p) output by the algorithm is equal to the binomial distribution B(N p)
, where N is a positive integer and 0 p 1.
Lemma 1. The simulation of the random oracle is perfect. That is, the distribution on the outputs of the random oracle is equal to the distribution on the outputs of Algorithm
RO.
Proof. We consider the probability that Algorithm RO replies Ý £ as the hash value of x £ . Fix the tables Ì and Ä at an arbitrary point according to Algorithm RO . Let Ì £ and Ä £ be the tables after replying Ý £ for the hash value of x £ . First, we consider the case where
According to our method, for any Ý £ that is not new, we have
Second, we consider the case where
The former represents the number of elements in X that are not to be assigned to someÝ such that there is (Ý ñ) ¾ Ä, and the latter represents the number of elements in Y that are not defined in Ä.
According to our method, for any Ý £ that is new and for any n
, and we have
Now let us consider what the probabilities given by Equations (1) and (2) imply. Both of the probabilities are equivalent to the probability that a hash function h chosen in the
Therefore the distribution on the outputs of the random oracle is equal to the distribution on the outputs of Algorithm RO.
Ù Ø
The Collision Tractable Random Oracle Model (CT-ROM)
Let X Y be finite sets. The collision tractable random oracle model has the collision oracle that is used to find collisions, in addition to a hash function h chosen randomly from all of the functions from X to Y and the random oracle associated with h. In this model the adversary has access to the collision oracle.
When the hash value of x is queried, the random oracle answers the corresponding Algorithm CO():
1. Pick uniformly x X. 2. In order to obtain the hash value Ý h(x), run Algorithm RO(x).
3. If n 1 for (Ý n) ¾ Ä, then return . 4. If n¸1 for (Ý n) ¾ Ä, then compute the following value:
is the probability to answerx ¾ X that is not new.)
5. Flip a biased coin with probability Pr[¬ 0] q (Ý n) .
6. If ¬ 0, then pick uniformly one entry (x Ý ) ¾ Ì satisfying x¸x and return (x x). 
Ù Ø
The Second-Preimage Tractable Random Oracle Model (SPT-ROM)
Let X Y be finite sets. The second-preimage tractable random oracle model has the second-preimage oracle that is used to find second-preimages, in addition to a hash function h chosen randomly from all of the functions from X to Y and the random oracle associated with h. In this model the adversary has access to the second-preimage oracle.
When the hash value of x is queried, the random oracle answers the corresponding value Ý in Ì h . When a second-preimage of (x Ý ) is queried, the second-preimage oracle answers as follows. If it has not answered that h maps x to Ý, it answers . If there is only one entry (x Ý) ¾ Ì h such that Ý Ý, then it answers . Otherwise, it answers
¼¸x . For this model, in addition to Algorithm RO, we construct an algorithm SPO. Algorithms RO and SPO are used to simulate the random oracle and the second-preimage oracle, respectively. Algorithm SPO uses the tables Ì and Ä that are commonly used in Algorithm RO.
Algorithm SPO(x Ý ):
If n¸1 for (Ý n) ¾ Ä, then compute the following value:
4. Flip a biased coin with probability Pr[¬ 0] q (Ý n) .
5. If ¬ 0, then pick uniformly one entry (x Ý ) ¾ Ì satisfying x¸x and returnx. 
The First-Preimage Tractable Random Oracle Model (FPT-ROM)
Let X Y be finite sets. The first-preimage tractable random oracle model has the firstpreimage oracle that is used to find first-preimages, in addition to a hash function h chosen randomly from all of the functions from X to Y and the random oracle associated with h. In this model the adversary has access to the first-preimage oracle.
When the hash value of x is queried, the random oracle answers the corresponding value Ý in Ì h . When a first-preimage of Ý is queried, the first-preimage oracle answers as follows. If there is no (x Ý) ¾ Ì h such that Ý Ý, then answers . Otherwise it answers uniformly onex such that (x Ý) ¾ Ì h satisfying Ý Ý.
For this model, in addition to Algorithm RO, we construct an algorithm FPO. Algorithms RO and FPO are used to simulate the random oracle and the first-preimage oracle, respectively. Algorithm FPO uses the tables Ì and Ä that are commonly used in Algorithm RO.
Algorithm FPO(Ý):
1. If there is no entry (Ý ñ) ¾ Ä then pick n according to the binomial distribution:
If n¸0 for (Ý n) ¾ Ä, then compute the following value:
Flip a biased coin with probability Pr[¬ 0] q (Ý n) .
6. If ¬ 0, then pick uniformly one entry (x Ý ) ¾ Ì and returnx. 
Ù Ø 4 Security of Signature Schemes
In this section, we consider the security of RSA-FDH [3] and RSA-PFDH [12] in four variants of the random oracle models. We also propose new signature schemes called RSA-PFDH · and RSA-PFDH¨, and consider the security in four variants of the random oracle models. We review the RSA assumption on which the security of four schemes are based. (N e z) where N e is generated by RSA(1 k ) and z £ N , it outputs z 1 e mod N with non-negligible probability. The RSA assumption is that there is no polynomial-time machine that solves the RSA problem.
Assumption 2 (The RSA Assumption). A polynomial-time machine is said to solve the RSA problem if given an RSA challenge
RSA-FDH
In this section, we show that RSA-FDH [3] is secure in the ROM, but not secure in the CT-ROM.
T S Ñ . We review RSA-FDH [3] .
Let Å 0 1 l be the message space and h a hash function such as
Then RSA-FDH is described as follows.
T S ÙÖ ØÝ. RSA-FDH is secure in the ROM. More precisely the following proposition was proved [3, 15] . We omit the proof, see [3, 15] for details.
Proposition 1. In the ROM, if the RSA assumption holds, there is no polynomial-time oracle query machine that breaks RSA-FDH by making queries to the signing oracle and the random oracle for h.
We show that RSA-FDH is insecure in the CT-ROM. Therefore can output a valid forgery with probability at least 1 e 1 2 .
Ù Ø
RSA-PFDH
In this section, we show that RSA-PFDH [12] is secure in the CT-ROM, but not secure in the SPT-ROM.
T S Ñ . We review RSA-PFDH [12] .
Let Å 0 1 l be the message space and h hash function such as h : 0 1
Then RSA-PFDH is described as follows.
T S ÙÖ ØÝ. We show RSA-PFDH is secure in the CT-ROM. Intuitively, in order to break RSA-PFDH in a straightforward way, it would be necessary to obtain a collision m r m
and the signature of m. However the randomness in the signature makes it diAEcult to make use of collisions, which are also randomly provided by the collision oracle. 
Theorem 2. In the CT-ROM, for all polynomial-time oracle query machines that break
Proof. (Sketch) We start with the original attack game with respect to EUF-CMA in the CT-ROM, and modify it step by step in order to obtain a game directly related to the adversary which solves the RSA problem. Let (N e Ý ) be the RSA challenge. Let dist(i j) be the di«erence between the probability that the adversary outputs a valid forgery in the Game i and that in the Game j .
-Game 0 : The original attack game with respect to EUF-CMA in the CT-ROM. The first probability is evaluated in a similar way as in Theorem 1. We have
The second probability is bounded as 
Therefore, can output a valid forgery with probability at least 1 e 
Ù Ø
RSA-PFDH ·
In this section, we propose RSA-PFDH · , and show that RSA-PFDH · is secure in the SPT-ROM, but not secure in the FPT-ROM.
T S Ñ . We construct RSA-PFDH · .
Let Å 0 1 l be the message space and h hash functions such that : 0 1
Then RSA-PFDH · is described as follows.
We show RSA-PFDH · is secure in the SPT-ROM. Intuitively, the adversary similar to that described in Theorem 3 does not work well. The reason is as follows. The adversary queries the signature of m, and obtain (r x). For s (r) Ý h(m s), the adversary then queries the second-preimage of Ý to the second-preimage oracle for h, and obtain m 
Proof. (Sketch)
We start with the original attack game with respect to EUF-CMA in the SPT-ROM, and modify it step by step in order to obtain a game directly related to the adversary which solves RSA problem. Let (N e Ý ) be the RSA challenge.
-Game 0 : The original attack game with respect to EUF-CMA in the SPT-ROM.
-Game 1 : We replace the random oracles for and h with Algorithms RO and RO h , and also replace the second-preimage oracles for and h with Algorithms SPO and SPO h in Section 3, respectively. Let us denote by Ì 1 and Ä 1 the tables commonly used in Algorithms RO and SPO , and also denote by Ì 2 and Ä 2 the tables commonly used in Algorithms RO h and SPO h . -Game 2 : We remove Steps 2-4 in Algorithms RO and RO h , and set « 1 (i.e. Algorithms RO and RO h always answer a new value). -Game 3 : In Algorithm RO at Step 5 (i.e. s 0 1 The first probability is evaluated in the a similar way as in Theorem 1. We have
The second probability is bounded as
Next, we evaluate the third probability as
The first probability is bounded as
T S ÙÖ ØÝ. We show RSA-PFDH¨is secure in the FPT-ROM. Intuitively, the adversary similar to that described in Theorem 5 does not work well. The reason is as follows.
The adversary queries the signature of m, and obtain (r x). For Û h(m r), the adversary queries the first-preimage of Û to the first-preimage oracle, and obtain m 
We start with the original attack game with respect to EUF-CMA in the FPT-ROM, and modify it step by step in order to obtain a game directly related to the adversary which solves RSA problem. Let (N e Ý ) be the RSA challenge. If the hash value of is queried by the signing algorithm, 
Ù Ø
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, by applying Liskov's idea, we have proposed the weakened random oracle models, i.e. the CT-ROM, the SPT-ROM, and the FPT-ROM.
The main purpose of this paper is to focus on the random oracle model and to capture its crucial properties which make the cryptosystems secure. Note that Halevi and Krawczyk [16] posed a question of exhibiting variants of the random oracle model where one can argue about functions that "behave randomly but are not collision resistant". Our formalization of the CT-ROM gives a partial answer to their question.
We do not intend to model the attacks recently presented by Wang et al. against MD5, SHA-1, etc [6, 7] . One important extension»generalization of our research would be to study the weakness of cryptosystems by taking into consideration the recently presented attacks. This direction is out of our scope in this paper.
Another direction of research would be to replace the basic property of the ROM that each entry is chosen uniformly at random and independent of the other entries. For example, we can extend our result concerning the FPT-ROM to the random permutation model. In this case, we would consider the oracles for both directions of the permutation, that is, the ideal cipher with a fixed key.
In order to show the di«erences of our models, we have focused on the RSA-based signature schemes. By replacing the RSA function with a trapdoor one-way permutation with the multiplicatively homomorphic property (i.e. f (x ¡ Ý) f (x) ¡ f (Ý)), we can generalize our results. The eAEciency of the reduction would be the same as that of the RSA-based schemes. If a trapdoor one-way permutation does not have the multiplicatively homomorphic property, we can still generalize our results, but the reductions are not tight. When f has the multiplicatively homomorphic property, then we can embed the information of Ý (the challenge instance of one-wayness) into all of the hash values queried by the adversary. When f does not have the multiplicatively homomorphic property, we cannot embed in a similar way as in the case with the multiplicatively homomorphic property. Therefore we have to choose one hash value to embed the information of Ý. In order to analyze the security of schemes, we have assumed that we can eAEciently sample from the binomial distribution B(N p) perfectly. We could relax this perfectness to statistically closeness by modifying the security proofs. Making polynomial-time algorithms or analyzing precisely the algorithms proposed before are also interesting problems found in this paper.
It is also interesting to analyze the security of other cryptosystems, e.g., encryption, identification, in our models.
